Effects of the share remuneration system on fisheries management targets and rent distribution

J. Guillen; Claire Macher; M. Merzéréaud; Jean Boncoeur; Olivier Guyader

doi:10.1086/679970

Journal articles

Effects of the share remuneration system on fisheries management targets and rent distribution

J. Guillen ^{1, 2} Claire Macher ² M. Merzéréaud ² Jean Boncoeur ² Olivier Guyader ²

1 ICM - Institute of Marine Sciences / Institut de Ciències del Mar [Barcelona]

2 AMURE - Aménagement des Usages des Ressources et des Espaces marins et littoraux - Centre de droit et d'économie de la mer

Abstract : Most fisheries worldwide remunerate their crew with a share system, where crew receive a part of the revenues or a part of the revenues less costs, rather than a fixed wage. Although labor is one of the main costs in fisheries and the share remuneration system has a strong influence on firm behavior and its economic performance, little attention has been paid it. In a share remuneration system, crew salaries can significantly increase when the economic performance of a vessel improves. This allows the crew to capture part of the fisheries rent. Bioeconomic analyses are performed for the Bay of Biscay nephrops fishery on main management targets. Results confirm the importance of considering a share system compared to a fixed remuneration system in vessel owner (capital) and crew (labor) rent distribution and fishing decisions.

Keywords : Bioeconomic modeling Open access Remuneration systems Share remuneration Lay system MSY MEY Nephrops

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Journal articles

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Humanities and Social Sciences

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https://hal.univ-brest.fr/hal-01726745
Contributor : Lisa Malguy <>
Submitted on : Thursday, March 8, 2018 - 3:16:02 PM
Last modification on : Tuesday, June 23, 2020 - 3:40:44 AM

Effects of the share remuneration system on fisheries management targets and rent distribution

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